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Biological markers of risk taking are prominent targets for clinical, developmental, 
and longitudinal research. With respect to brain function, several regions are considered 
central for risky choice, yet insights into the neural basis of risk taking stem primarily from 
studies using single measures. Considering that recent studies suggested different risk-taking 
measures cannot be used interchangeably, it is currently unclear whether core regions of the 
brain involved in risk show a measure-dependent functional dissociation. Reporting results 
from the imaging subsample (N = 116 young adults) of the Basel–Berlin Risk Study, we 
examine (1) the conjunction of average neural representations of experience-based risky 
choice in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task and description-based risky choice in monetary 
gambles, (2) the preservation of individual activation differences across the two measures, 
and (3) the explanatory power of the neural correlates of risky choice for behavior. Our results 
suggest common group-level activation increases in nucleus accumbens, inconsistent 
individual differences in regional activation across measures, and limited explanatory power 
of neural indices for behavior, within and across measures. Our findings help clarify 
commonalities and differences between the neural representation of experienced and 
described risk, and thus should inform research designs targeting individual differences in risk 
taking.  
 








Risk preference—whether in the economic sense of preferring high-variance monetary 
options over more certain ones or, more commonly, preferring options involving uncertain but 
potentially sizeable negative consequences (Schonberg et al., 2011)—impacts decisions 
across various life domains, including health, wealth, and criminality (Moffitt et al., 2011; 
Steinberg, 2013). Past literature offers numerous behavioral measures of risk preference 
(Appelt et al., 2011; Dohmen et al., 2011), yet recent research suggests these may provide 
different pictures of individuals’ appetite for risk as a function of the different cognitive 
processes they exploit (Mata et al., 2011; Defoe et al., 2015; Mamerow et al., 2016; van den 
Bos and Hertwig, 2017; Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni et al., 2017).  
One factor contributing to the divergence of behavioral measures resides in how 
individuals come to know about risk-relevant information: Description- and experience-based 
measures—henceforth referred to as described risk and experienced risk, respectively—share 
central characteristics of decision making under risk (e.g., processing of outcome magnitudes, 
probabilities and their integration into a subjective value signal informing choice), yet differ 
with regard to the (coincidental or necessary) involvement of additional cognitive processes, 
including affect, memory, and learning (Pleskac, 2008; Figner et al., 2009; Hertwig and Erev, 
2009; Mata et al., 2011; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011). Indeed, experienced risk measures 
have been proposed to be more ecologically valid because they elicit stronger affective 
responses as a product of their sequential nature (Schonberg et al., 2011). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, described and experienced risk have been found to elicit different choices, 
leading to different average and individual risk profiles (Mata et al., 2011; Mamerow et al., 
2016).  
Both described and experienced risk have been used to understand the neural basis of 
risk preference (Rao et al., 2008; Mohr et al., 2010; Schonberg et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2012; 
Bartra et al., 2013), yet very few studies have directly compared the two (Pletzer and Ortner, 
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2016; Blankenstein et al., 2018). Instead, much of our understanding of the neural correlates 
of risk preference comes from average activation profiles elicited from different measures in 
between-participant designs. Across such studies, three neural regions have been identified as 
belonging to a “risk matrix”, differentially promoting (nucleus accumbens in ventral 
striatum), inhibiting (insular cortex), and controlling (anterior cingulate cortex) risky choice 
(Knutson and Huettel, 2015). However, given the average nature of these results, “risk 
matrix” regions could present the union of commonly observed risk-related activation 
patterns, rather than an intersection of all involved regions. But to what extent do different 
measures of risk preference rely on the same cognitive and neural components? And how are 
these related to individual differences in risky choice? In the current study, we set out to 
examine the overlap of neural activation differences in “risk matrix” regions for experienced 
and described risk.  
To understand whether different measures elicit common neural responses, it is crucial to 
look beyond average (i.e., group-level) activation differences and probe whether activation 
differences converge between measures at the level of the individual. Owing to the often 
neglected lack of a match between group-level (i.e., average) and individual-level effects 
(Blanco et al., 2011; Bornstein et al., 2017), any observed commonality of average neural 
function in response to described and experienced risk does not necessarily indicate 
individual-level consistency (Fliessbach et al., 2010). Furthermore, regional activation 
differences do not necessarily reflect useful, reliable predictors of observed behavior 
(Poldrack et al., 2018), making it important to evaluate which neural indices of individual 
differences in described and experienced risk are predictive of choice, within and across 
measures.  
In sum, several neural regions have been proposed as core correlates of risk preference 
(Knutson and Huettel, 2015), yet it is unclear whether repeated-measures designs of neural 
activation differences for measures of experienced and described risk result in consistent 
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neural activation, at group and individual level, and the extent to which neural indices 
obtained from such measures can account for behavior. This, however, is crucial for our 
understanding of individual differences in risk preference, especially where neural indices 
inform studies investigating associated developmental trajectories (Moffitt et al., 2011; 
Braams et al., 2015) or clinical outcomes (Büchel et al., 2017). To tackle these issues, the 
current study uses task-dependent neural functional data from the imaging subsample of the 
Basel–Berlin Risk Study (Frey et al., 2017) in order to examine (1) whether experienced and 
described risk elicit common group-level activation differences in “risk matrix” regions (i.e., 
insula, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate cortex), (2) whether individual differences for 
activation in “risk matrix” regions are preserved (i.e., consistent) across the two measures, 
and (3) the explanatory power of neural indices from “risk matrix” regions for risky choice, 
within and across measures.  
Methods  
Participants 
We recruited an imaging subsample of 133 young adults from a pool of participants in 
the Basel–Berlin Risk Study, a large-scale study assessing individual differences, 
psychometric structure and biological underpinnings of risk preference (for an overview, see 
Frey et al., 2017 and https://osf.io/rce7g; Dutilh et al., 2017; Pedroni et al., 2017). Exclusion 
criteria for participation in the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) session were safety-
limiting permanent implants, a history of neurological or psychiatric conditions, usage of 
psychoactive medication or substances, and receiving psychiatric treatment. After quality 
control and exclusions (see Supplementary Materials for details), the final sample included in 
all analyses comprised 116 participants (62 females, mean age at scan = 25.4 years, SD = 2.6 
years, range = 20.4–30.1 years).  
Ethical approval was obtained from the German Society for Psychology, and the 
ethics committee of the Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human 
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Development; this study was conducted in accordance with the stipulated guidelines and 
regulations. 
Experimental measures and procedure 
Inside the scanner, participants completed two incentive-compatible risk-taking 
measures: the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), and monetary 
gambles (Tom et al., 2007). These were chosen because they are commonly used, relatively 
simple measures, for which average neural activation profiles (Tom et al., 2007; Rao et al., 
2008; Schonberg et al., 2012; Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013) and individual differences have 
been extensively investigated (Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2013; Peper et al., 2013; 
Helfinstein et al., 2014; Braams et al., 2015). Importantly, both measures feature similar 
concepts including loss, reward, and risk. Yet, whereas these parameters are explicitly 
described for monetary gambles, some (in particular “risk”) must be learned from experience 
in the BART (Wallsten et al., 2005; Pleskac, 2008). As shown schematically in Figure 1A, the 
BART involves sequentially inflating a series of virtual balloons in the absence of a priori 
knowledge about the underlying contingencies. For monetary gambles, individuals make 
repeated choices between two options: a gamble offering a 50% chance of a gain and a 50% 
chance of a loss, or a sure outcome of zero (Figure 1B). The individual performance variables 
of interest were mean number of pumps for the BART, and proportion of accepted gambles 
for monetary gambles. For further details on the two neuroimaging measures, other measures 
collected, the experimental procedure, MRI data acquisition and image preprocessing, see 
Supplementary Materials.  
fMRI model specification 
At the individual level, we concatenated the two runs for each of the two risk-taking 
measures, and specified one general linear model (GLM) for the BART and one for monetary 
gambles. To target the neural representation of risky decisions in both measures, we 
operationalized risky decisions as the following events: the decision to Pump (on reward 
 7 
balloons) in the BART, and to Accept a lottery in monetary gambles. Activation parameter 
estimates were obtained by convolving event onsets with a canonical hemodynamic response 
function, filtering out low-frequency components of the time-series data above 128 s 
(considered to be noise) and correcting for further temporal error autocorrelation by pre-
whitening the data using an AR(1) model (Henson, 2003). Movement parameters were 
entered as covariates.  
For our main contrasts of interest—risky versus safe decisions—we operationalized 
safe decisions as the decision to Cash out in the BART, and Reject a lottery in monetary 
gambles. For the BART, we contrasted decisions to Pump (on reward balloons) with 
decisions to Cash out. For monetary gambles, we contrasted decisions to Accept a lottery with 
decisions to Reject. Given the current focus on neural correlates of decision making under risk 
rather than correlates of anticipation or feedback-related processes, all analyses involved 
modeling the time from trial onset (i.e., display of stimulus) until choice (i.e., Pump/Cash out 
for BART or Accept/Reject for monetary gambles). At the group level, we specified a flexible 
factorial design with subject and measure as separate factors in order to obtain statistical 
parametric maps for mean activation patterns in the two measures and compute a conjunction. 
See Supplementary Materials for details. 
All contrast analyses of neuroimaging data were conducted at the level of the whole 
brain. Accounting for multiple comparisons, group-level and regression analyses were 
conducted using a family-wise error (FWE) cluster correction (p<.05), with a p<.001 
uncorrected voxel-wise (peak) threshold. We report the coordinates of local maxima in MNI 
space (mm). We obtained anatomical labels from the Neuromorphometrics Atlas in SPM8. 
Results are displayed on a customized study-specific group template, which we created by 
averaging all normalized structural volumes of all participants. 
Overview of statistical analyses 
Data and analysis scripts will be made available shortly via the Open Science 
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Framework; we will update the document and provide the link here.   
Behavioral data. To examine whether elicited risk taking in the BART and monetary 
gambles was successful with respect to mirroring behavioral patterns observed in the 
literature (Tom et al., 2007; Schonberg et al., 2012; Mamerow et al., 2016), we assessed 
aggregate and individual-level behavior under experienced and described risk via application 
of two mixed-effects regression analyses to individuals’ trial-by-trial performance in the 
BART and monetary gambles. For the BART, we assessed the effect of balloon capacity and 
having experienced an explosion on the last trial on risky choice (measured as the number of 
pumps on experimental balloons in a given trial). For monetary gambles, we assessed the 
effect of the magnitude of gains and losses on risky choice (measured as binary choice 
outcome Accept or Reject in a given trial). Both analyses controlled for the effects of age and 
gender on risky choice. See Supplementary Materials for details. 
Imaging data. We performed confirmatory analyses involving three “risk matrix” 
regions of interest (ROI) identified by previous work (Knutson and Huettel, 2015); the 
nucleus accumbens (NAcc), insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). For each person, we 
extracted the mean slope for activation differences between risky and safe decisions from the 
three ROIs, separately for BART and monetary gambles. All ROIs were derived from the 
Hammersmith atlas (www.brain-development.org). See Supplementary Materials for details. 
Additionally, we conducted some exploratory whole-brain analyses to ascertain local 
activation differences for experienced and described risk measures outside the “risk matrix” 
regions. When reporting the results, we declare exploratory analyses as such.  
Group-level conjunction of experienced and described risk. First, we examined 
group-level neural activations common to both measures as a function of risk (i.e., pumping 
relative to cashing out in the BART; accepting relative to rejecting an offer for monetary 
gambles), in particular to see the extent to which joint activation differences occur in NAcc, 
insula, and ACC. For this purpose, we conducted a whole-brain conjunction analysis of risky 
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versus safe decisions in the BART and monetary gambles following standard implementation 
routines in SPM. Specifically, we performed a conjunction analysis over two orthogonal 
contrasts that tested the conjunction null hypothesis rather than the global null hypothesis, 
allowing us to infer a conjunction of two effects (risky vs. safe in experienced and described 
risk) at significant voxels (Friston et al., 2005). We used visualizations of group maps for the 
BART and monetary gambles to establish whether average brain activity for contrasts of 
interest were comparable to published functional brain maps and whether our measures could 
capture typical neural reactions to risk (Tom et al., 2007; Rao et al., 2008; Schonberg et al., 
2012; Canessa et al., 2013).  
Individual-level consistency of neural activations in “risk matrix” regions for 
experienced and described risk. Second, we assessed whether individual differences in the 
neural representation of risky choice were consistent across the two measures. Recall that 
common activation in response to risk at group level is not necessarily synonymous with 
consistent individual differences: Even if the majority of individuals shows comparable 
patterns in each measure, this majority need not be made up of the same individuals. For this 
purpose, we extracted mean beta values from risky versus safe contrast images obtained for 
individual-level analyses of the BART (pumps vs. cash out) and monetary gambles (accept 
vs. reject) using “risk matrix” ROIs, and conducted correlational analyses between the neural 
indices of the two measures (brain–brain associations).  
Explanatory power of neural activations in “risk matrix” regions for risky choice. 
Third, we examined the explanatory power of experience- and description-based risk-related 
neural activation for risk-taking behavior, within and across measures. We conducted brain–
behavior associations focusing on the “risk matrix” ROIs, modeling whether individual 
differences in the neural response to risky versus safe decision making (1) in the BART were 
associated with mean number of pumps, (2) in monetary gambles were associated with 
proportion of accepted gambles, and (3) in the BART were associated with proportion of 
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accepted gambles in monetary gambles. Given the temporal order of the two measures, we did 
not test whether neural signal in monetary gambles accounted for BART behavior. We 
estimated brain–behavior associations by means of linear regression analyses with 
standardized variables and controlling for age and gender. This procedure yielded partial 
correlation coefficients for the association between measure-specific mean beta values 
extracted from the three ROIs and behavioral indices of risk preference in the BART (mean 
number of pumps) and in monetary gambles (proportion of accepted gambles). In addition, 
we ran exploratory whole-brain regression analyses to examine the explanatory power of 
activation differences outside “risk matrix” regions for behavior. For our analyses examining 
individual differences, we applied family-wise error correction based on four test families, 
and report which of the associations reach corrected significance thresholds. See 
Supplementary Materials for further details. 
To note, ROI-based brain–behavior associations have come under scrutiny for being 
based on non-independent indices (Poldrack and Mumford, 2009; Vul et al., 2009). For 
example, non-independence arises if (1) an ROI is defined as a result of analyses of the same 
data having identified this region as functionally relevant for a behavioral index, or (2) the 
events for which the neural index is computed are closely tied to the behavioral index (e.g., 
neural and behavioral index from the same measure). We argue that the ROI-based brain–
behavior associations computed in this study do not fall into either category. Recall that all 
our ROI analyses are based on structurally defined regions that were identified a priori as a 
result of independent research on the neural correlates of risk taking, and that our exploratory 
whole-brain regression analyses were computed after our focal ROI analyses. Furthermore, 
mean number of pumps and proportion of accepted gambles are widely used behavioral 
indices for risk taking, and within-measure brain–behavior associations may yield an upper 
bound for the explanatory power of localized brain activation. Importantly, regional activation 
differences may not be equally associated with behavior, hence we were interested in the 
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relative explanatory power of activity in a set of a priori regions, and the extent to which their 
relative contributions change as a function of the measure used.  
Results  
Behavioral results 
Table 1 contains group-based descriptive statistics for behavior in the two fMRI 
measures. The two outcome variables of interest - mean number of pumps (across reward 
balloons) for BART, and proportion of accepted gambles for monetary gambles - were 
approximately normally distributed (Figures 2A and 2B). 
Results from the mixed-effects modeling of the BART (Table 2) were in line with 
previous results (Schonberg et al., 2012; Mamerow et al., 2016), including main effects of 
gender (b = -0.16, SE = 0.08, p = 0.04) and previous explosion (b = -0.14, SE = 0.03, p < 
0.001). As expected, the mean number of pumps was lower for low-capacity (mean pumps = 
4.45, SD = 1.06) than high-capacity (mean pumps = 5.50, SD = 1.52) balloons (cf. Schonberg 
et al., 2012) but this difference did not translate into a significant main effect of balloon 
capacity (b = 0.03, SE = 0.06, p = 0.70). For monetary gambles, group-level acceptance rates 
for individual gambles (Figure 2C) were comparable with previous work (Tom et al., 2007). 
The results from the mixed-effects logistic regression model for monetary gambles yielded a 
main effect of age (b = -0.60, SE = 0.09, p < 0.001), gender (b = -0.37, SE = 0.19, p = 0.04), 
magnitude of gain (b = 0.39, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) and loss (b = -0.84, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001) 
on individuals’ decisions to reject or accept a risky gamble (Table 3).  
Examination of risk preference across the two measures revealed a lack of consistency 
at the level of the individual because proportion accepted in monetary gambles was not 
significantly associated with mean number of pumps in the BART (r = -0.11, p = 0.24; Figure 
2D). The lack of behavioral consistency was not a result of combining the two runs to 
compute one behavioral index for each task, as risky choice was consistent over the two runs 
in monetary gambles (r = 0.86, p < 0.001) and the BART (r = 0.63, p < 0.001). 
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Neuroimaging results  
Let us emphasize that both in the BART and monetary gambles, group-level activation 
differences for risky versus safe decisions (Table 4, Figure 3A and 3B) were in line with 
previously reported results (Tom et al., 2007; Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013; Pletzer and 
Ortner, 2016). For further details, see Supplementary Materials. On this basis, we can now 
begin to analyze how group-level and individual-level activation converges or fails to 
converge across the two paradigms for measuring risk preference.  
Group-level conjunction of experienced and described risk. One of our main goals 
was to examine the overlap of neural activation differences in response to experienced and 
described risk, in particular the extent to which joint activity may be observed in the “risk 
matrix” regions NAcc, insula, and ACC (Knutson and Huettel, 2015). A conjunction analysis 
of activation differences in response to risky versus safe options in the BART and monetary 
gambles revealed a common locally restricted risk signal in a small portion of the ventral 
striatum, the NAcc (Table 4, Figure 3C). Taking a risk thus seems to elicit an average 
measure-invariant neural signal in NAcc, but not in insula or ACC. Next, we turn to 
individual-level analyses to investigate whether individual differences in the neural response 
to risk are preserved across the two measures, and to examine their explanatory power for 
risky choice. 
Individual-level consistency of neural activations in “risk matrix” regions for 
experienced and described risk. We examined the consistency of neural signal in the NAcc 
across measures to assess whether being a conjunction region for experience- and description-
based risk activation means that the NAcc is informative for individual differences. Contrary 
to what might be expected, mean activation in NAcc in the BART was not significantly 
predictive of NAcc activation in monetary gambles (r = -.07, p =.48; Table 5, Figure 4A). 
Thus, although at the level of the group the two measures converged on NAcc activity, 
individual differences were not preserved across measures. In other words, we found group- 
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but not individual-level consistency for experience- and description-based risk-taking 
(Bornstein et al., 2017).  
We also examined the consistency of the neural signal in the remaining “risk matrix” 
regions. Mean activation in insula and ACC in the BART was significantly predictive of 
activation differences in ACC and insula in monetary gambles, respectively; these 
associations, however, were negative (r = -.45 and r = -.46; p < .001) rather than the positive 
correlations required to suggest consistency (Table 5, Figure 4A). These associations 
remained significant after application of correction thresholds (FWE) for the number of tests.  
Explanatory power of neural activations in “risk matrix” regions for risky 
choice. We used ROI analyses to examine whether activation differences in response to risky 
choice in the BART were predictive of mean number of pumps, and whether activation 
differences in response to risky choice in monetary gambles were predictive of proportion of 
accepted gambles. For the BART, ROI analyses revealed no significant associations 
(correlation coefficients r between -.19 and .01) between risk-related activation differences 
and performance as measured by mean number of pumps (Table 5, Figure 4C). In contrast, for 
monetary gambles, ROI-analyses supported the involvement of “risk matrix” regions in 
predicting choice in monetary gambles. Specifically, mean activation in NAcc, insula and 
ACC extracted from Accept versus Reject decisions in monetary gambles was significantly 
negatively associated with the proportion of risky gambles accepted (-0.3 < r < -0.52, all p < 
0.001; Table 5, Figure 4B). The links between neural signal and behavior in monetary 
gambles remained significant after controlling (FWE) for the number of tests conducted.  
We were also interested in brain–behavior associations across measures, that is, 
whether activation differences in the BART were predictive of risky choice in monetary 
gambles. Using ROI-specific neural signal, mean activation in ACC in BART was 
significantly positively associated with the proportion of gambles accepted (r = 0.20, p = 
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0.01; Table 5; Figure 4D), suggesting that control and monitoring processes in the BART 
account for some variance in risky choice in monetary gambles.  
Exploratory whole-brain regression analyses (whole-brain corrected) did not reveal 
significant brain–behavior associations for the BART or across measures, but revealed a set of 
neural regions for which the neural signal in monetary gambles was significantly associated 
with the proportion of accepted gambles (see Supplementary Table S2). 
Discussion  
In this study we investigated group- and individual-level neural representations of risk 
for two prototypical measures—the BART and monetary gambles—to systematically 
understand which components of the neural response to risk are measure-(in)variant, and 
investigate the extent to which neural indices explain individual differences within and across 
measures.  
At group level, our conjunction results in NAcc support the notion of a measure-
invariant core neural signal of risky choice across experienced and described risk (Knutson 
and Huettel, 2015). The striatum in general has been implicated in reward processing 
(Preuschoff et al., 2006; Izuma et al., 2008); to the extent that risk-taking is driven by the 
motivation to achieve a reward (Ravert et al., 2018), striatal activation is a common neural 
correlate of risk taking (Tom et al., 2007; Schonberg et al., 2012; Knutson and Huettel, 2015). 
Note that an alternative explanation for a common NAcc signal for experienced and described 
risk is the proposed role of the ventral striatum in the coding of prediction error (Hare et al., 
2008). Unfortunately, the two measures do not allow us to disentangle these different choice-
relevant signals, leaving open the possibility that the main commonality between experience- 
and description-based risk taking may be comparison of the current option with the status 
quo.  
In turn, the observed group-level activation differences in insula for the BART, but 
not monetary gambles, support the argument that experienced risk involves potentially more 
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affective and motivational processes compared with described risk (Hertwig and Erev, 2009; 
Schonberg et al., 2011). Indeed, the insula is heavily implicated in signaling subjective 
feelings and explicit motivation (Namkung et al., 2017), and is thought to inhibit risky choice 
(Knutson and Huettel, 2015). In this study, the feedback involved in the BART, but not 
monetary gambles, may have involved additional motivational components and led to the 
observed neural dissociation in insula. One primary contribution of such results is to highlight 
that although there may be core regions associated with risk preference (Knutson and Huettel, 
2015), some may be more “core” than others, depending on the measure used. 
Concerning the issue of individual differences, past work has made clear that group 
averages are not necessarily reflective of individual-level behavioral (Blanco et al., 2011; 
Bornstein et al., 2017) or neural (Fliessbach et al., 2010) patterns. We examined whether 
individual differences in neural activation are preserved across two measures and documented 
a lack of consistency of individual differences in neural activation for risky versus safe 
decisions under experienced and described risk. Specifically, although, on aggregate, joint 
activation increases were localized in NAcc across the two measures, individual differences in 
NAcc activation were not preserved from BART to monetary gambles. Examination of 
further regions previously identified as core functional correlates of risk and risk preference 
(Knutson and Huettel, 2015), i.e., insula and ACC, also failed to yield consistent (i.e., 
positively correlated) individual differences across measures. Although the mechanisms 
underlying group-level convergence but individual-level divergence (Hedge et al., 2017) can 
be debated, the current results suggest that individuals respond very differently to different 
measures, both behaviorally (Frey et al., 2017) and neurally.  
A last major aim was to examine the explanatory power of “risk matrix” regions for 
risky choice. Our results revealed significant brain–behavior associations within-measure for 
monetary gambles, but not for the BART. As for individual-level neural effects, the measure-
dependent explanatory power arises as a likely consequence of the specific processes afforded 
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by experienced and described risk (Hertwig and Erev, 2009; Mata et al., 2011). In an 
experience-based, sequential decision-making measure such as the BART, activation 
differences in a single region are less likely to be highly correlated with choice because 
choice depends on many interconnected processes (Pleskac, 2008; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 
2011; Schonberg et al., 2011). In contrast, the simple nature of description-based monetary 
gambles lends itself very well to the use of a choice rule, which, at brain level, is evident in 
choice-relevant neural signal. Concerning the specific brain–behavior associations identified, 
the observed associations for ACC and insula were in the expected negative direction 
(Knutson and Huettel, 2015); the more affect-based inhibition and control-related processes 
are experienced, the lower the number of risky gambles that are accepted. Further, we found 
that individuals with an on average lower NAcc signal in response to risky choice accepted a 
higher proportion of gambles. Intuitively, one may expect the opposite; namely, that higher 
NAcc (i.e., reward) signal is positively associated with risky choice. It is possible that the 
observed negative association is a corollary of our payoff matrix not being calibrated to 
individuals, which may result in choice being less discerning for those who place a similar 
subjective value on all gambles. Future research could easily address this issue by calibrating 
payoff matrices, for instance via an adaptive willingness-to-pay measure. Across measures, 
we obtained a link between ACC activation in the BART and proportion of accepted gambles. 
Given that ACC activation in the BART was not related to performance in the BART, an out-
of-measure link for ACC seems surprising and could also be a sequence effect rather than a 
robust link between experienced and described risk. Thus, for now, we consider this 
association an informative starting point for further investigation. 
There are some limitations to our study. First, we adopted two prototypical risk-taking 
measures as examples of experienced and described risk, which limits generalization. Past 
research, however, suggests that other tasks do not fare much better regarding behavioral 
consistency (Sharma et al., 2014; Pletzer and Ortner, 2016; Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni et al., 
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2017), suggesting that other measures would probably not show more extensive convergence 
at group- and individual level. Nevertheless, implementing additional measures based on 
experienced (Bechara et al., 1994; Figner et al., 2008) and described risk (Holt and Laury, 
2002) could address further interesting questions, including whether the convergence of 
measures is overall higher for experienced or described risk (Frey et al., 2017) and within the 
respective classes of experienced versus described risk preference measures.   
Second, despite our best efforts to create contrasts targeting the neural risk component 
in the BART and monetary gambles, risk and reward may not be easily distinguishable 
because the two components coincided in both measures. This is a special limitation for 
contrast analyses that average activation differences over particular events (e.g., Pumps or 
Accept decisions). One way to disentangle risk from reward is to use parametric analyses that 
map activation to specific functional forms, such as increases in risk or reward. However, 
standard implementations of the BART, such as the one used here and elsewhere (Lejuez et 
al., 2002; Schonberg et al., 2012; Helfinstein et al., 2014; Braams et al., 2015), do not allow 
for the isolation of risk from reward signal even by using parametric analyses, because risk 
and reward increase linearly over a given trial. Thus, further task manipulations are required 
that can disentangle risk from reward in the BART, for example, by introducing different (less 
correlated) payoff and risk (i.e., probability of explosion) functions. However, it deserves to 
be pointed out that in many real-world domains payoff (reward) and risk (probability) are 
negatively correlated (Pleskac and Hertwig, 2014). 
Third, our design is prey to order effects because we opted for a fixed task order as 
randomization would have required splitting the sample into two groups based on order, thus 
reducing power. Note, however, that the overall level of observed risk taking in the BART 
and monetary gambles was comparable to previous independent investigations (Tom et al., 
2007; Schonberg et al., 2012), risky choice within a task was relatively consistent across the 
two runs, and correlations between risky choice in the BART and monetary gambles did not 
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change substantially as a function of run number, overall providing little evidence for order 
effects.  
We would like to put forward two recommendations that arise directly from our 
results. First, a tempting richness of risk preference measures exists, but, as our results show, 
measures should not be used interchangeably. Increased transparency in selection criteria will 
not only help researchers make more informed choices between different risk-taking measures 
for their studies, but will also push the research community towards establishing a taxonomy 
of measures and their core biological underpinnings. Secondly, we suggest that whenever 
feasible, researchers include multiple measures in their designs. This would enable direct 
comparison of measures and, perhaps more importantly, allow analysis of their shared and 
unique components, for example, through psychometric modeling (Frey et al., 2017; Harden 
et al., 2017; Poldrack et al., 2018).  
To conclude, many longitudinal, clinical and developmental research designs focus on 
risk preference as a critical predictor or outcome, and often aim to establish links between 
individual differences in risk preference and neural structure or function (Moffitt et al., 2011; 
Braams et al., 2015; Holmes et al., 2016; Büchel et al., 2017). Until recently, neuroimaging 
studies investigated primarily group-level neural representations of risk and paid less attention 
to individual differences or measurement convergence. To successfully target individual 
differences in risk taking and understand the biological underpinnings, a switch is required—
especially within neuroscience—from group-level to individual-level research (Foulkes and 
Blakemore, 2018; Rosenberg et al., 2018), and from single- to multi-measure research 
(Poldrack et al., 2018). If the ultimate aim is to help individuals navigate an uncertain, risk-
laden world and make better choices, we first need to navigate and map the mainly uncharted 
territory of our risk preference measures. 
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Figure 1. fMRI measures. A, BART. upper row, Example cash-out trial. lower row, Example 
explosion trial. B, Monetary gambles. upper row, Example “Reject” trial. lower row, 
Example “Accept” trial.  
Figure 2. Behavior in the two fMRI measures. A, Distribution of mean number of pumps in 
the BART, collapsed across all risky balloons. B, Distribution of proportion accepted trials in 
monetary gambles. C, Payoff matrix overlaid with heatmap showing the observed probability 
of gamble acceptance in monetary gambles. D, Association between risky choice in the 
BART and monetary gambles. 
Figure 3. Statistical parametric maps of activation differences obtained for risky versus safe 
decisions under experienced and described risk. A, BART, Pumps > Cash out (cluster-level 
FWE p<.05, k>100). B, Monetary gambles, Accept > Reject (cluster-level FWE p<.05, 
k>100). C, Conjunction of joint increased activation differences in response to risky versus 
safe decisions in the BART (Pumps > Cash out) and monetary gambles (Accept > Reject) 
(cluster-level FWE p<.05). Activation differences are displayed on a customized study-group 
structural template. Note: The right (left) side of the image corresponds to the right (left) side 
of the brain. 
Figure 4. Partial correlations (controlling for age and gender) between mean neural signal 
extracted from ROIs for the BART contrast (Pumps vs. Cash out), mean neural signal 
extracted from ROIs for monetary gambles contrast (Accept vs. Reject), mean number of 
pumps in the BART, and proportion accepted trials in monetary gambles. A, Association 
between regional neural signals across measures (brain–brain). B, Brain–behavior association 
BART. C, Brain–behavior association monetary gambles. D, Brain–behavior association 
across measures. Note: NAcc = nucleus accumbens; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex. All 
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variables were z-standardized prior to plotting and analysis. Intercepts and slopes were 
estimated using robust regression analyses. 
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Figure 1. fMRI measures. A, BART. upper row, Example cash-out trial. lower row, 
Example explosion trial. B, Monetary gambles. upper row, Example “Reject” trial. lower 
















Figure 2. Behavior in the two fMRI measures. A, Distribution of mean number of 
pumps in the BART, collapsed across all risky balloons. B, Distribution of proportion 
accepted trials in monetary gambles. C, Payoff matrix overlaid with heatmap showing the 
observed probability of gamble acceptance in monetary gambles. D, Association between 
























Figure 3. Statistical parametric maps of activation differences obtained for risky 
versus safe decisions under experienced and described risk. A, BART, Pumps > Cash out 
(cluster-level FWE p<.05, k>100). B, Monetary gambles, Accept > Reject (cluster-level FWE 
p<.05, k>100). C, Conjunction of joint increased activation differences in response to risky 
versus safe decisions in the BART (Pumps > Cash out) and monetary gambles (Accept > 
Reject) (cluster-level FWE p<.05). Activation differences are displayed on a customized 
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study-group structural template. Note: The right (left) side of the image corresponds to the 




Figure 4. Partial correlations (controlling for age and gender) between mean neural 
signal extracted from ROIs for the BART contrast (Pumps vs. Cash out), mean neural signal 
extracted from ROIs for monetary gambles contrast (Accept vs. Reject), mean number of 
pumps in the BART, and proportion accepted trials in monetary gambles. A, Association 
between regional neural signals across measures (brain–brain). B, Brain–behavior association 
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BART. C, Brain–behavior association monetary gambles. D, Brain–behavior association 
across measures. Note: NAcc = nucleus accumbens; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex. All 
variables were z-standardized prior to plotting and analysis. Intercepts and slopes were 
estimated using robust regression analyses. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for outcome measures for the BART and monetary 
gambles. 
Outcome Mean (SD) Range 
BART   
Number of completed trials (including controls) 60.72 (6.23) 37–73 
Number of low-capacity balloons (max. 12) 20.12 (2.12) 12–25 
Number of high-capacity balloons (max. 20) 20.25 (2.20) 12–25 
Average pumps on low-capacity balloons (max. 12) 4.45 (1.06) 2.40–6.95 
Average pumps on high-capacity balloons (max. 20) 5.50 (1.52) 2.25–9.93 
Number of explosions experienced 15.81 (3.81) 6–24 
Reaction time pumps control (seconds) 0.62 (0.47) 0.002–15.25 
Reaction time pumps risky (seconds) 0.71 (0.53) 0.002–15.09 
Reaction time cash out (seconds) 0.90 (0.70) 0.27–11.59 
MONETARY GAMBLES   
Number of valid responses 142.67 (1.96) 133–144 
Proportion accepted gambles 0.47 (0.16) 0.13–0.92 
Reaction time Accept decisions (seconds) 1.31 (0.47) 0.46–2.98 




Table 2. Mixed effects linear regression model for trial-by-trial number of pumps in 
the BART. Age was entered as a continuous variable, sex (0=male, 1=female), capacity (0=12 
pumps max, 1=20 pumps max), and explosion on previous trial (0=no, 1=yes) were entered as 
dichotomous variables.  
  
Estimate SE df t  p 
Intercept 0.16 0.07 136.63 2.44 0.02 
Age 0.02 0.04 111.26 0.38 0.70 
Sex -0.16 0.08 111.22 -2.07 0.04 
Capacity 0.03 0.06 113.21 0.49 0.63 
Explosion on previous trial -0.14 0.03 111.04 -4.19 < 0.001 
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Table 3. Mixed-effects logistic regression model for trial-by-trial decision making (0 
= Reject, 1 = Accept) in monetary gambles. Age, gain, and absolute loss were entered as 
continuous variables, sex (0=male, 1=female was entered as a dichotomous variable.  
 
 
Estimate SE z  p 
Intercept 0.52 0.15 3.55 < 0.001 
Age -0.59 0.09 -6.35 < 0.001 
Sex -0.37 0.19 -2.02 0.04 
Gain 0.39 0.02 25.73 < 0.001 




Table 4. Significant peak coordinates obtained from group-level contrast analyses for 
BART and monetary gambles. 
  MNI (mm)    
Region R/L x y z T  k 
BART: Pumps > Cash out 
Supplementary motor cortex L -6 -2 60 11.07 2534 
Posterior cingulate gyrus R 24 -42 14 8.26 206 
Nucleus accumbens L -6 8 -4 7.84 106 
Nucleus accumbens R 8 8 -4 7.83 137 
Anterior insula L -30 26 4 7.45 177 
Anterior insula R 40 22 6 7.10 170 
Posterior cingulate gyrus L -14 -34 20 6.56 131 
BART: Cash out > Pumps 
Inferior occipital gyrus L -38 -76 -12 20.00 100274 
MONETARY GAMBLES: Accept > Reject 
Caudate / Nucleus accumbens R 10 16 -2 7.31 278 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) L -44 34 14 7.00 427 
Caudate / Nucleus accumbens L -8 16 -2 6.94 209 
Angular gyrus L -32 -72 36 6.89 1182 
Inferior temporal gyrus L -50 -66 -12 6.21 449 
Supramarginal gyrus L -46 -40 40 5.93 358 
Precentral gyrus L -36 4 26 5.83 165 
Middle frontal gyrus L -24 14 50 5.58 176 
CONJUNCTION Pumps > Cash out & Accept > Reject 
Nucleus accumbens R 8 12 0 6.03 49 
Nucleus accumbens L -8 10 -4 5.72 36 
All analyses whole-brain, using FWE cluster correction (p<.05), with a p<.001 uncorrected voxel-wise 
(peak) threshold; cluster extent threshold k >100; controlled for effects of age and gender; k = number 
of voxels in cluster within which peak coordinate is located. Cluster extent threshold not applied to 
conjunction analysis. 
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Table 5. Partial correlations (controlling for age and gender) between regional (ROI) neural and behavioral indices of risk preference, 
computed within and across measures. 
 
Analysis Index NAcc  Insula ACC  
  b (SE) t (p) b (SE) t (p) b (SE) t (p)  





















































Note: Estimates obtained from linear regression analyses with standardized outcome and predictor variables. For models within measures, 
behavioral outcome measures and neural predictors originated from the same measure. For models across measures, the behavioral outcome 
originated from monetary gambles, and the neural predictors from the BART. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, NAcc = nucleus accumbens 
- SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS - 
 
Title: Group and individual differences in the neural representation of described and 
experienced risk 
 
Authors: Loreen Tisdall, Renato Frey, Andreas Horn, Dirk Ostwald, Lilla Horvath, Felix 








The participants in this neuroimaging study came from an existing pool of individuals 
who had participated in the Basel-Berlin Risk Study (BBRS). The BBRS entailed 
participation in a one-day laboratory session, during which individuals completed an 
extensive battery of measures assessing individual differences in risk taking (including self-
report, frequency, and behavioral measures), cognitive capacity, personality, affect, and 
genetics (an overview of all subsamples, measures, and further details on the BBRS is 
reported on https://osf.io/rce7g). The BBRS was run in Basel and in Berlin but for the current 
study we recruited only individuals from the Berlin site due to the location of the 
neuroimaging facilities available. The size of the imaging subsample is reflective of 
oversampling to achieve an effective sample size of N~100 (Yarkoni, 2009) in the event of 
participant exclusions (e.g., due to excessive head motion in the scanner, image artefacts). 
Of the 133 individuals recruited, two participants aborted the session before any 
functional sequences were collected thus were removed from all subsequent analyses. We 
excluded a further five participants due to excessive head motion inside the scanner (see 
image preprocessing section for movement parameter thresholds), one participant due to 
incidental anatomical findings, four participants due to incomplete data (e.g., only one 
paradigm was completed inside the scanner), and five participants due to non-compliance 
with the scanner protocol (e.g., falling asleep, reports of having mixed up button box 
responses). The final sample included in all analyses comprised 116 participants (62 females, 
mean age at scan = 25.4 years, SD = 2.6 years, range = 20.4–30.1 years). 
Experimental paradigms and additional measures 
Inside the scanner, participants completed the Balloon Analogue Risk Task and a 
monetary gambles task; we describe these measures in more detail below. Outside of the 
scanner, we collected self-reported demographic data (date of birth, gender, marital status, 
educational attainment, native language, and current occupation). Of note, only gender and 
age at the MRI session (calculated from date of birth) were included as covariates in the 
current analyses; all other demographic measures were merely collected to describe the 
sample and ascertain the external validity of our findings with respect to sample 
characteristics.  
As part of an independent project, we assessed individuals’ height and weight, collected 
data from a verbal fluency task, and administered various self-report measures of impulsivity 
(Schmidt et al., 2008), eating-related behaviors and attitudes (Meermann and Vandereycken, 
1987; Pudel and Westenhöfer, 1989; Westenhöfer, 1992); given that these measures were not 
part of the current analyses, we do not elaborate on these measures here.  
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). The BART involves a series of virtual 
balloons, which individuals are tasked with pumping up in the absence of knowledge about 
when the balloon will burst. Successful pumps (i.e., pumps that do not lead to a balloon 
explosion) earn the participant a certain amount of money, but an explosion leads to the loss 
of the money accumulated on the current trial. Individuals thus make repeated decisions 
about whether to (1) continue pumping up a balloon (i.e. risky decision), with the prospect of 
accumulating more money, or (2) stop pumping and cash out any accumulated earnings on a 
given trial (i.e. safe decision), yet foregoing any further earnings on that trial. Importantly, as 
individuals move from trial to trial and experience the outcome of their decisions (e.g., a 
balloon explosion), they can build a mental representation of explosion distributions for a 
given balloon type over time.  
The BART version implemented in the current study featured two risky balloon types 
and a control balloon. The maximum capacity for the two risky balloons was set to be 12 and 
20 pumps, respectively; that is, on average, balloons with a capacity of 12 pumps burst earlier 
than balloons with a capacity of 20. Risky balloons were represented in blue and red to 
discriminate between balloon types based on capacity, with capacity-color assignment being 
randomized between participants but stable across the two runs. Control balloons were 
presented in gray, had a maximum capacity of 16, and were added to control for neural 
processes that required no decision making (e.g., motor or visual). Participants merely 
inflated control balloons until they disappeared from the screen.  
On any given trial, balloon capacity was determined via a random draw from a 
uniform distribution of values between one and the maximum capacity for the presented 
balloon type. Participants completed two runs of the BART, with a short break in-between. 
Each run was programmed to continue for 10 min, after which the final balloon was 
presented. Given that decisions are made sequentially and may become more difficult as the 
number of successful pumps in a trial increases, we did not impose a time limit on the 
decision phase of a given trial, resulting in the number of balloons played varying between 
individuals (Table 1). Intervals between trials and between successive stimuli within trials 
were randomized (mean inter-trial interval = 4.39 s, range = 1–11 s; mean inter-stimulus 
interval = 1.5 s, range = 1–2 s).  
The outcome variable typically used in the BART to reflect individuals’ risk 
preference is the average number of pumps administered on cash-out trials only (Lejuez et 
al., 2002; Wallsten et al., 2005; Rolison et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2016), also referred to as the 
adjusted average number of pumps. In line with previous research (Mamerow et al., 2016; 
Frey et al., 2017), in the current study the adjusted average number of pumps was highly 
correlated with the average number of pumps across all balloons (r = 0.97, p < 0.001). Given 
these results, we used the average number of pumps across all balloons as outcome variable 
in the BART, because it allowed us to retain a maximum number of trials for analysis while 
working with congruent trial numbers in both neural and behavioral analyses.  
It has been suggested that computational models of the BART can help to disentangle 
different cognitive processes underlying the observed behavior in this task, including gain 
and loss sensitivity, response consistency, risk preference, or learning (Wallsten et al., 2005; 
van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011). However, attempts to model the BART have frequently 
resulted in highly correlated model parameters and failed parameter recovery (van 
Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011), suggesting that the purported benefit of using parameters obtained 
from currently available models may be limited. We set out to model behavior in the BART 
with two standard models: a target model that assumes a fixed strategy is being used 
(Pleskac, 2008; Frey et al., 2015) and a Bayesian sequential risk-taking model that allows for 
dynamic updating processes (Pleskac, 2008). In line with past research the estimation of the 
model parameters turned out to be unreliable, and we thus do not report the modeling attempt 
here (a possible reason for the unreliable model parameters may be the lack of strong learning 
effects). Consequently, we relied on the average number of pumps as a simpler and generic 
index of risk preference in all subsequent analyses.  
Monetary gambles. We further adopted a monetary gambles paradigm with mixed 
outcomes as an example of a description-based risk-taking measure (i.e., both gains and 
losses were possible) (Tom et al., 2007; Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013; Canessa et al., 2013; 
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2013). In the current study, participants made a total of 144 decisions 
between a sure zero-outcome and a 50/50 gamble. Individual gambles were constructed to 
populate an asymmetric 12x12 payoff matrix (Figure 1B, right panel) with gains of between 
10 and 32 (increments of 2) and losses of between 5 and 16 (increments of 1). Each gamble 
was presented once, with the order of gamble presentation randomized between participants. 
On a given trial, once the gamble was presented, participants had 3 s to accept or reject the 
gamble via respective button presses. Although in previous studies participants gave 
responses indicating the strength of their decision (Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2013), 
we collected binary responses (accept/reject) only. The rationale for this was that responses 
under time pressure may bias individuals towards using more extreme responses (Paulhus 
and Vazire, 2007) and that previously reported analyses were commonly conducted for 
collapsed (binary) responses (Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2013). We therefore did not 
expect a substantial benefit from adopting more fine-grained response options. Participants 
completed two runs with a short pause in-between, each run featuring 72 gambles. Jitters 
were introduced between trials (mean inter-trial interval = 4.32 s, range = 1–11 s). 
Whereas we computed the proportion of accepted gambles out of all gambles for 
which a response was provided as an index of risk preference, a simple model that captures 
sensitivity to gains versus losses has been used to capture decision making for monetary 
gambles (Tom et al., 2007; Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013; Canessa et al., 2013). However, 
the critical parameter of this model, loss aversion, was highly correlated with the proportion 
of accepted gambles (r = -0.9, p < 0.001). Consequently, we relied on the proportion of 
accepted gambles as a simpler and generic index of risk preference in all subsequent 
analyses. 
Experimental procedure 
Participants who had previously completed the laboratory session of the BBRS were 
contacted via phone and informed about the MRI follow-up study. Interested individuals 
were screened for any contraindications regarding MRI safety. For the current analyses, we 
did not link participants’ data from the laboratory and MRI session, using only data collected 
during the MRI session. At the time of the MRI session, individuals completed a 2-min 
training run for the BART and monetary gambles before entering the scanner. The scanner 
protocol took 75 minutes and included a high-resolution structural scan, two functional 
sequences for the BART, two functional sequences for monetary gambles, a resting state 
sequence and a diffusion-weighted imaging sequence. For the current study, only the high-
resolution structural scan and the functional sequences were utilized, with the structural scan 
only serving normalization purposes during preprocessing of functional imaging data. The 
resting-state and diffusion-weighted sequences were not part of the current analysis and are 
not discussed further. The order of scanner sequences was fixed, the BART preceding the 
gambles task. The risk-taking paradigms were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), and responses inside the scanner were 
collected via a COVILEX response box system (series 1.X, Magdeburg, Germany) using the 
right-hand index and middle finger.  
After the MRI session, individuals reported demographic data and completed 
additional measures reported above. Individuals received a fixed fee of 25 Euro for their 
participation. In addition, participants could increase their earnings based on performance in 
the two scanner paradigms. For the BART, participants received 0.05 Euro for each 
successful pump on a balloon that was cashed out, i.e., did not explode. For monetary 
gambles, one trial was drawn at random and, if the participant had accepted the trial, was 
played out. The resulting loss or gain was combined with money made in the BART. Trials 
which were drawn but which the participant had rejected resulted in a 0 Euro outcome. 
Participants were told about the incentive structure at the start of the MRI session and 
received cash earnings at the end of the session (average actual payment = 41.50 Euro, SD = 
14.50 Euro). 
MRI data acquisition and image preprocessing 
Neuroimaging data were collected at the Magnetic Resonance Imaging Laboratory at 
the Max Planck Institute for Human Development (Berlin, Germany) on a 3T Siemens MRI 
system with 12-channel head coil. Participants received a magnetization-prepared rapid 
gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (repetition time = 2500 ms, echo time = 4.77 ms, 
inversion time = 1100 ms, flip angle = 7 degrees, field of view = 256 × 256 mm2, 192 slices, 
voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm3). In each of the four functional runs, up to 320 functional T2*-
weighted BOLD echo-planar images were acquired for every person (repetition time = 2010 
ms, echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 78 degrees, field of view = 192 × 192 mm2, voxel size = 
3 × 3 × 3 mm3, 33 transversal slices/volume with 15% distance factor). Image preprocessing 
and analyses were carried out using standard procedures implemented in SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). Preprocessing involved realignment and 
co-registration of functional to structural volumes. Volumes were nonlinearly warped into 
standard stereotactic (MNI) space based on structural scans using the New Segment method 
(Ashburner and Friston, 2005). To control for spatial noise and average effects that may arise 
as a function of residual anatomical differences between subjects, images were spatially 
smoothed using an 8-mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 
fMRI model specification 
BART. To model the neural activation in response to experienced risk in the BART, 
we specified a first level design matrix for each individual which included the following 
regressors per run (see Supplementary Figure S1 for an exemplary design matrix): Onset 
vector of pumps for control balloons, two onset vectors for pumps on reward balloons, onset 
vector for cash outs, onset vector for explosions, and six motion parameters estimated during 
the realignment process. We included two onset vectors for pumps on reward balloons to 
facilitate different analyses. Our main analysis focused on contrasting risky decisions with 
safe decisions on the BART, which we operationalized as contrasting pumping on risky 
balloons with the decision to cash out. One potential confound of such a contrast is that there 
may be systematic biases in the history of trials leading to a cash out decision. Concretely, 
cash-out decisions may not be similarly distributed across trials with regards to their onset, 
but perhaps happen early on in the trial as a result of mounting tension or the motivation to 
ensure some saved earnings. In building a contrast between cash-out events and pump events, 
any such systematic biases may also bias the neural signals. To address this issue, for every 
individual included in the analysis, we isolated the maximum serial position of all cash-out 
decisions and used this to cap the serial position of pumps included in the first onset vector; 
we refer to this vector as ‘matched pumps’. Onsets for the remaining pumps (i.e., those 
exceeding the maximum serial position of all cash-out decisions) were included in the second 
pumps vector; together, the two vectors facilitated supplementary analyses contrasting pumps 
on all risky (i.e. reward) balloons with pumps on control (i.e., non-reward balloons). 
 The onset vector for explosions was included in order to account for additional 
variance, better isolate the main effects of interest, and also remove neural responses to 
explosions from baseline activity. We did not differentiate between onsets for high- and low-
capacity balloons because preliminary analyses in which we contrasted pumps on high-
capacity with pumps on low-capacity balloons yielded no significantly different neural 
activations as a function of balloon type; consequently, we collapsed pumps across high- and 
low-capacity balloons for all analyses. For this main contrast of interest—risky versus safe 
decisions—we contrasted cash-out decisions with matched pumps, using the contrast weights 
[0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] to assess Pumps (matched) > Cash out, and [0 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] for 
Pumps (matched) < Cash out. 
Neuroimaging analyses of BART data usually involve contrasting activation 
differences in response to pumps on reward balloons with pumps on control balloons (Rao et 
al., 2008; Schonberg et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2016). This procedure, however, does not address 
the question of risk preference directly because it merely contrasts activation for conditions 
with and without a decision component thus providing a general picture of the neural 
correlates of decision making but not risk preference. The ubiquity of contrasting reward and 
control pumps in the BART in the literature, however, allows for a direct comparison of 
group-based results originating from different studies. Thus, we supplemented our focal 
analysis with a contrast of all pumps on reward versus control balloons. For this 
supplementary contrast of pumps on reward versus control balloons, we used the contrast 
weights [-2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] to compute Control pumps < Reward pumps, and [2 -1 -1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0] to compute Control pumps > Reward pumps. 
Monetary gambles. For the individual-level modeling of monetary gambles 
decisions, we specified one GLM, which targeted the neural representation of risky versus 
safe decisions (Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013) and included the following regressors (see 
Supplementary Figure S2 for an exemplary design matrix): Onset vector for all Accept 
decisions, onset vector for all Reject decisions, six motion parameters estimated during the 
realignment procedure. The simplicity of the paradigm allowed for this comparatively 
straightforward design matrix with only two regressors of interest, nevertheless yielding 
clean (event-unrelated) baseline activity. Emulating previous analyses (Barkley-Levenson et 
al., 2013) and striving for a contrast analysis that is comparable for risk in both the BART 
and monetary gambles, individuals’ Accept decisions were contrasted with Reject decisions.  
To estimate activation differences for risky versus safe decisions in monetary 
gambles, we used the contrast weights [1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0] to estimate Accept > Reject, and [-1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0] to estimate Accept < Reject. 
At the group level, we specified a flexible factorial design with subject and measure 
as separate factors in order to obtain statistical parametric maps for mean activation patterns 
in the two measures and compute a conjunction. Within-subject contrast images from risky 
versus safe decisions in monetary gambles and the BART were entered as two blocks, one 
block per measure (see Supplementary Figure S3 for design matrix). We assumed 
independence for the subject and measure factors but equal variance only for the subject 
factor. Gender and age were entered as covariates of no interest. See Supplementary 
Materials for details about the design matrices, onset vectors, contrast weights and additional 
contrast analyses. 
Overview of statistical analyses  
Behavioral data. The specification of regression models and selection of predictor 
variables for both tasks followed previously reported trial-level effects (Wallsten et al., 2005; 
Tom et al., 2007; Mamerow et al., 2016). To model trial-specific effects on risky choice in 
the BART, we regressed the number of pumps on experimental balloons (in a given trial) 
onto average effects of balloon capacity as a proxy for the level of risk (12/20), whether the 
previous trial ended in an explosion (yes/no), age and sex (0=male, 1=female), allowing for 
random effects for balloon capacity and previous explosion (nested within individual). For 
monetary gambles, we specified a logistic mixed-effects model, in which the decision to 
accept or reject a particular lottery in a given trial was regressed onto average effects of 
magnitude of the gain, magnitude of the loss, age and sex (0=male, 1=female), as well as 
individual effects for gain and loss magnitude. Before fitting the models, all continuous 
variables were normalized and categorical variables dummy-coded. In the BART, number of 
pumps was normalized separately for each of the two experimental balloon types.  
All behavioral analyses were run in R (R Project for Statistical Computing; 
RRID:SCR_001905 http://r-project.org), using the packages lme4 (lme4: Linear mixed-
effects models using Eigen and S4; R package v 1.1–8; http://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=lme4) and lmerTest (lmerTest: Tests in linear mixed effects models; R 
package v 2.0–25; http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lmerTest). We used the functions 
lmer and glmer for the mixed-effects models of continuous and binary outcome variables, 
respectively. To obtain p-values for the fixed-effects test statistics in lmerTest, the calculation 
of the denominator degrees of freedom adopts Satterthwaite’s approximation (cf. SAS proc 
mixed theory). 
For analyses of individuals’ trial-by-trial data coming from the BART, control 
balloons were not included in the mixed-effects modeling. Control balloons merely constitute 
the baseline for the neural analyses and offer no insight into decision making in the BART. 
Imaging data. For each person we extracted a mean signal for neural activations that 
were larger for risky compared with safe options from three regions of interest (ROI): the 
nucleus accumbens (NAcc), insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Mean signal for a 
particular ROI was operationalized as the mean of all regression slopes extracted from all 
voxels contained in the structurally defined ROI. Concretely, for the BART, we extracted the 
mean of the regression slopes for the contrast Pumps > Cash out, and for monetary gambles 
Accept > Reject. All ROIs were structurally defined based on the Hammersmith atlas nr30r83 
(http://brain-development.org/brain-atlases/adult-brain-maximum-probability-map-hammers-
mith-atlas-n30r83-in-mni-space/).  
Initial plotting of mean beta values extracted from the three ROIs indicated relatively 
normally distributed mean signals for both measures, except for a small number of possible 
outliers for signals extracted from ACC (n = 2) and insula (n = 1) in the BART, and ACC (n 
= 1) in monetary gambles. To account for any biasing effects, we computed robust regression 
analyses (“rlm” function in R package MASS (Venables and Ripley, 2002) using method 
“MM”) and obtained a correlation coefficient of r = 0.97 (p < 0.001) between the coefficients 
from standard and robust analyses. Consequently, we only report estimates obtained from 
standard regression analyses. Results from ROI analyses were not confounded by laterality 
because similar findings were obtained from analyses extracting mean beta values from the 
two hemispheres separately. Concatenating the two runs from each paradigm to compute one 
neural index did not bias the results; comparable findings were observed for supplemental 
ROI analyses based on two separate runs per measure. 
Corrections for multiple testing. To account for the number of analyses, we applied 
correction procedures to contrast analyses of neuroimaging data and individual differences 
analyses of ROI data. All initial contrast analyses of neuroimaging data were conducted at the 
level of the whole brain. Accounting for multiple comparisons, a cluster-forming threshold (p 
< .001, uncorrected) was applied, followed by family-wise error correction at peak level (p < 
.05). To avoid putting too much emphasis on potentially uninformative single-activated 
voxels, we applied an extent threshold of a minimum of 100 contiguous voxels for all whole-
brain group-level analyses. As we were agnostic regarding the potential overlap of voxels 
activated by both fMRI paradigms, we removed the extent threshold from our conjunction 
analysis.  
To control for the number of analyses examining individual differences, we report 
which of the associations reach significance thresholds after family-wise error correction. For 
this purpose, we define four families of tests: (1) brain–brain associations (three tests); (2) 
brain–behavior associations for the BART (four tests; one whole-brain multiple regression 
analysis and three regression analyses based on extracted mean beta values from ROIs); (3) 
brain–behavior associations for monetary gambles (four tests; one whole-brain multiple 
regression analysis and three regression analyses based on extracted mean beta values from 
ROIs); and (4) brain–behavior associations across the two measures (four tests; one whole-
brain multiple regression analysis plus three regression analyses based on extracted mean 
beta values from ROIs). 
RESULTS 
Neuroimaging results  
In the BART, taking a risk (decisions to pump) versus going safe (decisions to cash 
out) was associated with increased activity in striatum (specifically bilateral NAcc), left 
anterior insula, and right precentral gyrus, extending into supplementary motor cortex (Table 
4, Figure 2A); results for this contrast are comparable with previous results (Pletzer and 
Ortner, 2016). Due to the various cognitive and visual aspects surrounding cash-out 
decisions, examination of the reverse main effect revealed widespread bilateral decreased 
activity, particularly in thalamus extending into hippocampal and parahippocampal regions 
and lateral occipital cortex. Because of the very short temporal delay between cash-out 
decisions and the subsequent visual feedback (~ 1 s), inclusion of the onset and duration of 
the visual feedback for cash-out decisions in the GLM did not achieve a more localized cash-
out signal. Replication analyses of average activation differences for pumps on risky versus 
control balloons yielded results comparable with those of previous studies (Rao et al., 2008; 
Schonberg et al., 2012), including increased activation for peak coordinates located in 
bilateral ventral and dorsal striatum, bilateral anterior insular cortex, inter-hemispheric 
anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex, as well as decreased activation in inter-hemispheric 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and posterior parietal cortex, and bilateral 
parahippocampal gyrus and posterior insula (Table 4). 
For monetary gambles, decisions to accept a risky gamble, when compared with 
decisions to reject, were associated with increased activation in several neural regions, 
including peak coordinates located in bilateral caudate extending into NAcc, right ACC, left 
angular gyrus, left inferior temporal and frontal gyrus (Table 4, Figure 2B). Examination of 
the reverse main effect yielded no significant deactivation. The pattern of activations found is 
comparable to those found in similar measures involving decisions from description 
(Barkley-Levenson et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, replication analyses of average activation differences for pumps on 
reward versus control balloons in the BART (Table S1) yielded results comparable with 
previous studies (Rao et al., 2008; Schonberg et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2016). 
FIGURE LEGEND 
 
Figure S1. Exemplary SPM design matrix for first (i.e., individual) level modeling of neural 
activation in the BART. 
Figure S2. Exemplary SPM design matrix for first (i.e., individual) level modeling of neural 
activation in monetary gambles. 
Figure S3. SPM design matrix for second (i.e., group) level modeling of main effects for the 







Figure S1. Exemplary SPM design matrix for first (i.e., individual) level modeling of 




Figure S2. Exemplary SPM design matrix for first (i.e., individual) level modeling of 


















Figure S3. SPM design matrix for second (i.e., group) level modeling of main effects 




















































Grand mean scaling :<no grand Mean scaling>
Global normalisation :< o global normalisation>
Parameters :2 condition, +2 covariate, +0 block, +0 nuisance
4 total, having 4 degrees of freedom
leaving 228 degrees of freedom from 232 images
TABLE LEGEND 
 
Table S1. Significant peak coordinates obtained from group-level contrast analyses for 
pumps on experimental (i.e., reward) balloons and control balloons in the BART. 
Table S2. Significant peak coordinates obtained from multiple regression analysis to identify 
brain–behavior associations for monetary gambles. 
 
Table S1. Significant peak coordinates obtained from group-level contrast analyses 
for pumps on experimental (i.e., reward) balloons and control balloons in the BART. 
  MNI (mm)    
Region R/L x y z T  k 
BART: Pumps_Risky > Pumps_Control 
Supplementary motor cortex R 4 22 40 25.61 49140 
Supramarginal gyrus R 46 -42 44 17.26 5649 
Occipital pole L -12 -102 -2 15.10 2845 
BART: Pumps_Control > Pumps_Risky 
Angular gyrus L -48 -66 22 21.21 50828 
Medial frontal cortex L -2 58 -12 18.65 5684 
All analyses whole-brain, FWE cluster correction (p<.05), with p<.001 uncorrected voxel-wise (peak) 
threshold, controlled for effects of age and gender; k = number of voxels in cluster within which peak 
coordinate is located. 
 
Table S2. Significant peak coordinates obtained from multiple regression analysis to 
identify brain–behavior associations for monetary gambles. 
  MNI (mm)    
Region R/L x y z T  Voxels 
Accept>Reject ~ Proportion accepted gambles: Positive association 
Occipital pole R 24 -96 16 8.39 376 
Central operculum R 40 -12 20 8.06 406 
Precentral gyrus R 26 -22 52 7.85 1017 
Occipital pole L -26 -96 14 7.23 262 
Medial frontal cortex R 10 48 -14 7.12 358 
Middle temporal gyrus L -56 -10 -20 6.75 437 
Superior temporal gyrus R 62 -30 12 6.57 205 
Parietal operculum L -38 -40 18 6.14 101 
Superior temporal gyrus R 60 -8 -6 6.06 153 
Accept>Reject ~ Proportion accepted gambles: Negative association 
Anterior insula R 36 24 -4 12.89 10048 
Anterior insula L -34 18 -6 11.82 1155 
Supramarginal gyrus R 42 -40 42 11.61 4519 
Supramarginal gyrus L -50 -38 46 10.60 2888 
Middle cingulate gyrus L -2 -26 30 8.22 313 
Precentral gyrus L -52 8 28 7.76 700 
Inferior temporal gyrus R 56 -56 -14 7.36 240 
Precentral gyrus L -28 -12 52 7.29 321 
All analyses whole-brain, FWE cluster correction (p<.05), with p<.001 uncorrected voxel-wise (peak) 
threshold, and cluster extent threshold k >100, controlled for effects of age and gender; k = number of 
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